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Abstract
In settings where players have a limited access to liquidity, represented in the form of budget
constraints, efficiency maximization has proven to be a challenging goal. In particular, the social
welfare cannot be approximated by a better factor then the number of players. Therefore, the
literature has mainly resorted to Pareto-efficiency as a way to achieve efficiency in such settings.
While successful in some important scenarios, in many settings it is known that either exactly one
incentive-compatible auction that always outputs a Pareto-efficient solution, or that no truthful
mechanism can always guarantee a Pareto-efficient outcome. Traditionally, impossibility results
can be avoided by considering approximations. However, Pareto-efficiency is a binary property
(is either satisfied or not), which does not allow for approximations.
In this paper we propose a new notion of efficiency, called liquid welfare. This is the maximum
amount of revenue an omniscient seller would be able to extract from a certain instance. We
explain the intuition behind this objective function and show that it can be 2-approximated
by two different auctions. Moreover, we show that no truthful algorithm can guarantee an
approximation factor better than 4/3 with respect to the liquid welfare, and provide a truthful
auction that attains this bound in a special case.
Importantly, the liquid welfare benchmark also overcomes impossibilities for some settings.
While it is impossible to design Pareto-efficient auctions for multi-unit auctions where players
have decreasing marginal values, we give a deterministic O(log n)-approximation for the liquid
welfare in this setting.
1 Introduction
Budget constraints play a major role in many settings of interest, being internet advertisement one
of the most important examples. In fact, the choice of budget to spend is the first question asked to
advertisers in the interface of Google Adwords, even before they are asked bids or keywords. Much
work has been devoted to understanding the impact of budget constraints in sponsored search
auctions. See. e.g., [1, 14, 9]. Budgets are generally important in settings where the magnitude
of the financial transactions is very large. Benoit and Krishna [4] point out the importance of
budgets in privatization auctions in Eastern Europe and in the sale of spectrum in the US, and
more generally in settings where the magnitude of values involved is so large that it might exhaust
the players liquid assets. Pai and Vohra [21] illustrate this situation by saying that “not every
potential buyer of a David painting who values it at a million dollars has access to a million dollars
to make the bid.” For a more extensive discussion on the source of financial constraints, we refer
to Che and Gale [8].
Due to its practical relevance, it is not surprising that so many theoretical investigations have
been devoting to analyzing auctions for budget constrained agents. For analyzing the impact of
budget in the revenue of standard auctions one can cite [8] and [4], and for designing mechanims
optimize or approximately optimize revenue, one can cite: [16, 18, 21, 6, 7].
When the objective is welfare efficiency rather then revenue, the literature has early stumbled
upon impossibility results. The traditional social welfare measure, the sum of player’s values for
their outcomes, is known not to work well under budget constraints. Indeed, a folklore result shows
that even if budgets are known to the auctioneer, no incentive-compatible auction can achieve a
better than n approximation for the social welfare, where n is the number of players. This motivates
the search for incentive-compatible auctions satisfying weaker notions of efficiency. Dobzinski, Lavi
and Nisan [11] suggest studying Pareto-efficient auctions: the outcome of an auction is said to be
Pareto-efficient if there it no alternative outcome (allocation and payments) where no agent (bidders
or auctioneer) are worse-off and at least one agent is better off. If budgets are public, the authors
give an incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient multi-unit auction based on the Ausubel’s clinching
framework [2]. Furthermore, they show that this auction is the unique truthful auction that always
produces Pareto-efficient solution. The study of Pareto-efficient auctions for budget constrained
players has been extended to different settings in a sequence of follow-up papers [5, 13, 9, 14, 15].
Beyond Pareto Efficiency?
It therefore seems that Pareto efficiency has emerged as the de-facto standard for measuring effi-
ciency in settings where bidders are budget constrained. Indeed, most of the aforementioned papers
and results provide positive results by offering new auctions. Yet, this is far from being a complete
solution from both theoretical and practical point of views. We now elaborate on this issue.
In a sense, the uniqueness result of Dobzinski et al [11] for public budgets – that shows that the
clinching auction is the only Pareto efficient, truthful auction – may be viewed negatively. Rare
are the cases in practice in which the designer sole goal is to obtain a Pareto efficient allocation. A
more realistic view is that theory provides the designer a toolbox of complementary methods and
techniques designed to obtain various different goals (efficiency, revenue maximization, fairness,
computational efficiency, etc.) and balance between them. The composition of these tools as
well as their adaptation to the specifics of the setting and fine tuning is the designer’s task. A
uniqueness result – although extremely appealing from a pure theoretical perspective – implies that
the designer’s toolbox contains only one tool, obviously an undesirable scenario.
Furthermore, although from a technical point of view the analysis of the existing algorithms is
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very challenging and the proof techniques developed are quite unique to each setting, the auctions
themselves are all variants of the same basic clinching idea of Ausubel [2]. Again, it is obviously
preferable to have more than just one bunny in the hat that will help us design auctions for these
important settings.
The situation is obviously even more severe in more complicated settings, where even this
lonely bunny is not available. For example, for private budgets and additive multi-unit auctions,
an impossibility was given by [11], for heterogenous items and public budgets by [13, 12] and for
as multi-unit auctions with subadditive valuations and public budgets, by Goel, Mirrokni and Paes
Leme [14, 17].
Alternatives to Pareto Efficiency
Our main goal is to research alternatives to Pareto efficiency for budget constrained agents. We
start from the observation that a Pareto efficient solution is a binary notion: an allocation is either
Pareto efficient or not, and there is no sense of one allocation being “more Pareto efficient” than the
other. This is in contrast with efficiency in quasi linear environments where the traditional welfare
objective induces a total order on the the allocations.
Our main goal in this paper is to provide a new measure of efficiency for budgeted settings. The
desiderata for this measure are: (i) it is quantifiable, i.e., attaches a value to each outcome; (ii) is
achievable, i.e., can be approximated by incentive-compatible mechanisms and (iii) allows different
designs that approximate welfare.
The measure we propose is called the liquid welfare. Before defining it, we give a revenue-
motivated definition of the traditional social welfare in unbudgeted settings and show how it nat-
urally generalizes to budgeted settings. One can view the traditional welfare of a certain outcome
as the maximum revenue an omniscient seller can obtain from that outcome. If each agent i has
value vi(xi) for a certain outcome xi, the omniscient seller can extract revenue arbitrarily close to∑
i vi(xi) by offering this outcome to each player i for price vi(xi) − ǫ. This definition generalizes
naturally to budgeted settings. Given an outcome, xi, the willingness-to-pay of agent i is vi(xi),
which is the maximum he would give for this outcome in case he had unlimited resources. His
ability-to-pay, however, is Bi, which is the maximum amount of money available to him. We define
his admissibility-to-pay as the maximum value he would admit to pay for this outcome, which is
the minimum between his willingness-to-pay and his ability-to-pay. The liquid welfare of a certain
outcome is defined as the total admissibility-to-pay. Formally W¯(x) =
∑
imin(vi(xi), Bi).
An alternative point of view is as follows: efficiency should be measured only with respect to
the funds available to the bidder at the time of the auction, and not the additional liquidity he
might gain after receiving the goods in the auction. When using the liquid welfare objective, the
auctioneer is therefore freed from considering the hypothetical use the bidders will make of the
items they win in the auction and can focus only on the resources available to them at the time of
the auction.
This objective satisfies our first requirement: it associates each outcome with an objective
measure. Also, it is achievable. In fact, the clinching auction [11], which is the base for all auction
achieving Pareto-efficient outcomes for budgeted settings, provide a 2-approximation for the liquid
welfare objective. To show that this allows flexibility in the design, we show a different auction
that also provides a 2-approximation and reveals a connection between our liquid welfare objective
and the notion of market equilibrium.
It is appropriate to discuss the applicability and limitations of the liquid welfare objective. We
would like to begin by illustrating a setting for which it is not applicable. If one were to auction
hospital beds or access to doctors, it would be morally repugnant to privilege players based on their
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ability-to-pay. Therefore, we are not interested in claiming that the liquid welfare objective is the
only alternative to Pareto efficiency, but rather argue that in some settings it produces reasonable
results. Developing other notions of efficiency is an important future direction.
Still, in many settings capping the welfare of the agents by their budgets makes perfect sense.
Consider designing a market like internet advertising which aims at a healthy mix of good efficiency
and revenue. In practice, players that bring more money to the market provide health to the market
and make it more efficient. In real markets, there are practices to encourage wealthier players to
enter the market. Therefore, privileging such players in the objective is somewhat natural.
An interesting question is whether one can have a truthful mechanism for additive valuations
with public budgets that provides an approximation ratio better than 2 approximation. We show
a lower bound of 43 . Closing the gap remains an open question, but we do show that for the special
case of 2 players with identical public budgets there is a truthful auction that provides a matching
upper bound.
We then move one to consider a setting in which truthful auction that always output Pareto-
efficient solution do not exist: indivisible multi-unit auctions with additive valuations and private
budgets. For this setting we borrow ideas from Bartal, Gonen and Nisan [3] and provide a deter-
ministic O(log2 n) approximation to the liquid welfare. In fact, the algorithm is even more powerful
since the approximation ratio holds even if the valuations of the bidders are known to be subadditive.
Related Work
We have already surveyed results designing mechanisms for budget-constrained agents. Here, we
focus on surveying results directly related to our efficiency measure and to our philosophical ap-
proach to efficiency maximization. As far as we know, the liquid welfare was first appeared in
Chawla, Malec and Malekian [7] for the first time as an implicit upper bound on the revenue that
a mechanism can extract.
Independently and simultaneously, two other approaches were proposed to provide quantitative
guarantees for budgeted settings. Devanur, Ha and Hartline [10] show that the welfare of the
clinching auction is a 2-approximation to the welfare of the best envy-free equilibrium. Their
approach, however, is restricted to settings with common budgets, i.e., all agents have the same
budget.
Syrgkanis and Tardos [22] leave the realm of truthful mechanisms and study the set of Nash
and Bayes-Nash equilibria of simple mechanisms. For a wide class of mechanisms they show that
the traditional welfare in equilibrium of such mechanism is a constant fraction of the optimal liquid
welfare objective (which they call effective welfare). Their approach differs from ours in two ways:
first they study auctions in equilibrium while we focus on incentive compatible auctions. Second,
the guarantee in their mechanism is that the welfare of the allocation obtained is always greater
than some fraction of the liquid welfare. The guarantee of our mechanisms is stronger: we construct
mechanisms in which the liquid welfare is always greater than some fraction of the liquid welfare,
which implies in particular that the welfare is greater than some fraction of the liquid welfare (since
the welfare of an allocation is at least its liquid welfare).
Summary of Our Results
In this paper we have proposed to study the liquid welfare. We have provided two truthful algorithms
that provide a 2 approximation to this objective function for the setting of multi-unit auctions with
public budgets. For the harder setting of multi-unit auctions with subadditive valuations and
private budgets we have provided a truthful algorithm that provides an O(log2 n). For submodular
bidders, the same mechanism provides an O(log n) approximation.
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The biggest immediate problem that we leave open is to determine whether there is an algo-
rithm for multi unit auction with private budgets that obtain a constant approximation ratio. The
question is even open if the valuations are known to be additive. More generally, are there truthful
algorithms that provides a good approximation for combinatorial auctions? On top of that, no-
tice that computational considerations might come into play: while all of the constructions that
we present in this paper happen to be computationally efficient, there might be a gap between
the power of truthful algorithms in general and the power of computationally efficient truthful
algorithms.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Environments of interest and auction basics
We consider n players and a set X of outcomes (also called environment). For each player, let
vi : X → R+ be the valuation function for player i. We consider that agents are budgeted quasi-
linear, i.e., each agent i has a budget Bi and for an outcome x and for payments π1, . . . , πn, the
utility of agent i is: ui = vi(x) − πi if πi ≤ Bi and −∞ o.w. Below, we list a set of environments
we are interested:
1. Divisible-multi-unit auctions and additive bidders: X = {(x1, . . . , xn);
∑
i xi = s} for some
constant s and vi(x) = vi · xi, so we can represent the valuation function of each agent by a
single real number vi ≥ 0.
2. Divisible-multi-unit auctions with subadditive bidders: X = {(x1, . . . , xn);
∑
i xi = s} for some
constant s and vi(x) = vi(xi), where vi : R+ → R+ is a monotone non-decreasing subadditive
function. A valuation function vi is subadditive if for every x1, x2, vi(x1+x2) ≤ vi(x1)+vi(x2).
3. 0/1 environments: X ⊆ {0, 1}n and vi(x) = vi if xi = 1 and vi(x) = 0 otherwise. Again the
valuation is represented by a single vi ≥ 0.
An auction for a particular setting elicits the valuations of the players and budgets B1, . . . , Bn
and outputs an outcome x ∈ X and payments π1, . . . , πn for each agents respecting budgets, i.e.,
such that πi ≤ Bi for each agent. We will distinguish between public budgets and private budgets
mechanisms. In the former, the auctioneer has access to the true budget of each agent1. In the
later case, agents need to be incentivized to report their true budget. In either case, the valuations
of each agent are private. We will focus on designing mechanisms that are incentive compatible
(a.k.a. truthful), i.e., are such that agents utilities are maximized once they report their true value
in the public budget case and their true value and budget in the private budget case. We will also
require mechanisms to be individually rational, i.e., agents always derive non-negative utility upon
bidding their true value.
In the case of divisible multi-unit auctions and additive bidders, the valuations can be repre-
sented by real numbers, So we can see the auctions as a pair of functions x : Rn+ × R
n
+ → R
n
+
and π : Rn+ × R
n
+ → R
n
+ that map (v,B) to a vector of allocations x(v,B) ∈ R
n
+ and a vector of
payments π(v,B) ∈ Rn+. The set of functions that induce incentive compatible and individually
rational auctions are characterized by Myerson’s Lemma:
1Most of the papers in the literature on efficient auctions for budgeted settings [11, 13, 14, 9, 15] fall in this
category, including classical references as, Laffont and Robert [16] and Maskin [19].
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Lemma 2.1 (Myerson [20]) A pair of functions (x, π) define an incentive-compatible and indi-
vidually rational auction iff (i) for each v−i, xi(vi, v−i) is monotone non-decreasing in vi and (ii)
the payments are such that: πi(vi, v−i) = vi · xi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0 xi(u, v−i)du.
2.2 Efficiency measures
The traditional efficiency measure in mechanism design is the social welfare which associates for
each outcome x, the objective: W(x) =
∑
i vi(x). It is known that one cannot even approximate
the optimal welfare in budgeted settings in an incentive-compatible way, even if the budgets are
known and equal. The result is folklore and we only sketch the proof here for completeness:
Lemma 2.2 (folklore) Consider the divisible-multi-unit auctions and additive bidders. There is
no α-approximate, incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism x(v), π(v) with α < n.
For α = n there is the mechanism that allocates the item at random to one player and charges
nothing.
Proof : Let all the agents have budget Bi = 1. First notice that limvi→∞ xi(vi, v−i) ≥ α
−1 since∑
j vj · xj(v) ≥ α
−1maxi vi ≥ α
−1vi, so: xi(v) +
∑
j 6=i
vj
vi
· xj(v) ≥ α
−1. Taking vi →∞ we get that
limvi→∞ xi(vi, v−i) ≥ α
−1.
By incentive compatibility, vixi(v) − πi(v) ≥ vixi(v
′
i, v−i) − πi(v
′
i, v−i). Using the fact that
0 ≤ πi ≤ 1 we have: vixi(v) ≥ vixi(v
′
i, v−i)− 1 so: xi(v) ≥ xi(v
′
i, v−i)−
1
vi
. Taking v′i →∞ we get:
xi(v) ≥ α
−1 − 1vi . Summing for all players we get 1 ≥
∑
i xi(v) ≥ nα
−1 −
∑
i
1
vi
. Taking vi → ∞
for all i, we get nα−1 ≤ 1.
Due to impossibility results of this flavor, efficiency was mainly achieved in the literature through
Pareto efficiency. We say that an outcome (x, π) with x ∈ X and πi ≤ Bi is Pareto-efficient if there
is no alternative outcome where the utility of all the agents involved (including the auctioneer,
being his utility the revenue
∑
i πi) does not decrease and at least one agent improves. Formally,
(x, π) is Pareto optimal iff there is no (x′, π′), x′ ∈ X, π′i ≤ Bi such that:
u′i = vi · x
′
i − π
′
i ≥ ui = vi · xi − πi,∀i and
∑
i π
′
i ≥
∑
i πi and
∑
i vix
′
i >
∑
i vixi
In particular, if the budgets are infinity (or simply very large), then the only Pareto-optimal out-
comes are those maximizing social welfare. For the setting of divisible-multi-unit auctions with
additive bidders, this is achieved by the Adaptive Clinching Auction of Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan
[11]. Moreover, the authors show that this is the only incentive-compatible, individually-rational
auction that achieves Pareto-optimal outcomes. The auction is further analyzed in Bhattacharya
et al [5] and Goel et al [15].
In this paper we propose the liquid welfare objective function:
Definition 2.3 (Liquid Welfare) In a budgeted setting, we define the liquid welfare associated
with outcome x ∈ X by W¯(x) =
∑
imin{vi(x), Bi}.
We will refer to the optimal liquid welfare as W¯∗ = maxx∈X W¯(x). It is instructive yet straight-
forward to see that:
Lemma 2.4 For divisible-multi-unit auctions and additive bidders, the optimal liquid welfare W¯∗
occurs for x¯∗i = min
(
Bi
vi
, [1 −
∑
j<i x¯
∗
j ]
+
)
where players are sorted in non-increasing order of value,
i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn.
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1 2
1/4
1/2
v1
x¯∗
1
x¯∗
1
(v1, v−1) =


1/4, 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 1
1/2, 1 ≤ v1 ≤ 2
1/v1, 2 ≤ v1
Figure 1: Depiction of the first component of x¯∗ = argmaxxW¯(x) for a 3 agent instance with
v = (v1, 1, 2) and B = (1, 1/4, 1). The figure highlights the non-monotonicity of the optimal
solution x¯∗(v).
An easy observation is the optimal allocation for W¯∗ is not monotone in vi, and hence cannot be
implemented by a truthful auction. For example, consider 3 agents with values v1 = v, v2 = 1, v3 = 2
and budgets B1 = 1, B2 =
1
4 , B3 = 1. Now, it is simple to see that x¯
∗
1(v1) is not monotone in v1 as
depicted in Figure 1.
2.3 VCG and the liquid welfare objective
The reader might suspect, however, that a modification of VCG might take care of optimizing the
liquid welfare benchmark. This is indeed true for a couple of very simple settings. For example,
for selling one indivisible item, a simple Vickrey auction on modified values: v¯i = min{vi, Bi}
provides an incentive compatible mechanism that exactly optimized the liquid welfare objective.
More generally:
Theorem 2.5 (0/1 environments) Given a 0/1-environment X ⊆ {0, 1}n with valuations vi(x) =
vi if xi = 1 and zero otherwise. Then running VCG on modified values v¯i = min{vi, Bi} is incentive
compatible and exactly optimized the liquid welfare objective W¯∗.
The proof is trivial. This slightly generalizes to other simple environments of interest, for
example, matching markets, where there are n agents and n indivible items and each agent i
has a value vij for item j and possible outcomes are perfect matchings. Running VCG on v¯ij =
min{vij , Bi} provides an incentive compatible mechanism that also exactly approximated W¯
∗.
This technique, however, does not generalize past those few special cases:
Example. Consider the problem of allocating 1 divisible good among n agents. One possible
VCG-reduction is to run VCG assuming that the agents values are v¯i(xi) = min{Bi, vi · xi}. This
approach breaks since the resulting mechanism is not monotone (Figure 1) and hence not incentive
compatible. Other VCG approach is to assume agents are quasi-linear with values v¯i = min{vi, Bi}.
This approach generates an incentive compatible mechanism, but fails to produce non-trivial ap-
proximation guarantees. Consider for example on agent with B1 = 2 and v1 = 2 and other n − 1
agents with vi = 1000 and Bi = 1. The reduction gives an auction between quasi-linear agents
with v¯1 = 2 and v¯i = 1 for i = 2..n. The auction, therefore, allocates the entire item to player 1,
generating liquid welfare W¯(x) = 2, while W¯∗ = O(n). The same example works for allocating a
large number of identical indivisible goods.
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3 A First 2-Approximation: The Clinching Auction
In the previous section we defined our proposal for an efficiency measure in budgeted settings: the
liquid welfare objective W¯. The second item in the desiderata for a new efficiency measure is
that it is achievable, i.e., it could be optimized or well-approximated by an incentive compatible
mechanism. In this section we show a mechanism that provides a 2-approximation for the liquid
welfare, while still producing Pareto-efficient outcomes. The mechanism we use is the Adaptive
Clinching Auction [11, 5, 15]. In the next section we will provide another truthful auction that
provides a 2-approximation, and show that with respect to the liquid welfare the new auction is
actually better on an instance-by-instance basis.
We begin by reviewing the auction. The Adaptive Clinching Auction is described by means of
an ascending price procedure: we consider a price clock, whose price p starts at zero and gradually
ascends. Let’s say that the clock ascends in increments of ǫ. Initially, the good is un-allocated and
each player has their entire initial budget. For each price, we calculate how much each player would
like to acquire at each given price, which is his remaining budget over the price p if the price is below
his marginal value. We call such value the demand. For each player i we let player i acquire at
price p an amount δi of the good corresponding to the difference between the un-allocated amount
and the sum of demands of the other players. Then δi is allocated to player i and his budget is
subtracted by p · δi. In the limit as ǫ goes to zero, the auction is decribed by means of the following
ascending price procedure:
Definition 3.1 (Adaptive Clinching Auction) Consider one unit of a divisible good to be sold
to n agents with valuations v1, . . . , vn per unit and budgets B1, . . . , Bn. We assume vi 6= vj for each
i 6= j 2. The final outcome is calculated by means of an ascending price procedure which can be
cast as a differential equation: define functions xi(p), π(p) defined for each p ∈ R+. Also, define
the auxiliary function S(p) = 1−
∑
i xi(p) which represents the remnant supply and define the sets
A(p) and C(p) which we call the active set and the clinching set respectively:
A(p) = {i; p < vi} C(p) = {i ∈ A(p);S(p) =
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj−pij(p)
p }
Now, xi(p) and πi(p) are defined by means of the following rules:
• for p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn}, xi(p), πi(p) are differentiable and the derivatives for i ∈ C(p) are given
by ∂pxi(p) = S(p)/p for ∂pπi(p) = S(p) and for i /∈ C(p) ∂pxi(p) = ∂pπi(p) = 0.
• given a function f and a price p, we define by f(p−) = limx↑p f(x) and f(p+) = limx↓p f(x).
So, for p = vi, we define: δ
i
j =
[
S(vi−)−
∑
k∈A(vi)\j
Bk−pij(vi−)
vi
]+
and xj(vi+) = xj(vi) =
xj(vi−)+δ
i
j, πj(vi+) = πj(vi) = πj(vi−)+vi ·δ
i
j for j ∈ A(vi) and xj(vi+) = xj(vi) = xj(vi−),
πj(vi+) = πj(vi) = πj(vi−) for j /∈ A(vi).
The final allocation and payments of the clinching auction are given by limp→∞ xi(p) and
limp→∞ πi(p) respectively. Since the values of xi(p) and πi(p) are constant for p > maxi vi, the
limit is reached for finite price.
Bhattacharya et al [5] show that the procedure described above defines an incentive compatible,
individually rational auction and that the outcomes are always Pareto-efficient. Before proving that
2If two values are equal, perturb the values to vi − ǫ
i and take the limit as ǫ → 0. We refer to the appendix of
Goel, Mirrokni and Paes Leme [15] for a detailed description of the clinching auction when two values are the same
without resorting to perturbations of the initial input.
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the clinching auction is a good approximation to W¯∗ we define the concept of clinching interval,
which will be central in our proof. The clinching interval corresponds to to the prices for which the
clinching auction allocates goods. Formally:
Definition 3.2 (Clinching Interval) Given agents with valuations vi and budgets Bi, let S(p) be
the remnant supply function in Definition 3.1. Let p0 = inf{p;S(p) < 1} and pf = sup{p;S(p) > 0}.
We call the interval [p0, pf ], the clinching interval.
We will also use the following lemma from Bhattacharya et al [5] (Lemmas 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 in
their paper) :
Lemma 3.3 If the second highest value is below the budget of the highest value agent, the entire
good is allocated to the highest value agent. Otherwise, there is some agent k for which the final
price pf = vk. Moreover the following facts hold:
• ∀j, xj > 0⇒ vj ≥ vk.
• ∀j, vj > vk ⇒ πj = Bj .
• ∀i, j, vi < vk < vj ⇒ δ
i
j = Bi/vi and δ
k
j = (Bk − πk)/vk.
Now we are ready to state and prove our main Theorem:
Theorem 3.4 The clinching auction is a 2-approximation to the liquid welfare objective. In other
words, given n agents with values per unit vi and budgets Bi, let x, π be the outcome of the clinching
auction for such input. Then, W¯(x) ≥ 12W¯
∗.
Proof : We assume for simplicity that the values of the players are all distinct. The case where
two players have the same value can be handled by perturbing the input and considering the limit
on the size of the perturbation. We assume agents are sorted by value, i.e., v1 > v2 > . . . > vn.
In the case where v2 ≤ B1, the clinching auction produces the allocation x1 = 1 according to
Lemma 3.3. If v1 ≤ B1, then W¯(x) = v1 = W¯
∗, otherwise: W¯(x) = B1 ≥
1
2(B1 + v2) ≥
1
2W¯
∗.
In the remaining case, let x, π be the outcome of the clinching auction and let [p0, pf ] be the
clinching interval. First, we give an upper bound to W¯∗. Let x¯∗ be the outcome achieving W¯∗,
then:
W¯∗ =
∑
i
min(Bi, vi · x¯
∗
i ) ≤
∑
i;vi>p0
Bi +
∑
i;vi≤p0
p0x¯
∗
i =
∑
i;vi>p0
Bi + p0

1− ∑
i;vi>p0
Bi
vi


+
by the format of x∗ in Lemma 2.4. Now, we give two lower bounds for W¯(x) using Lemma 3.3. Let
pf = vk. By our assumption that the players have distinct values, there is only a single player with
value pf .
W¯(x) ≥
∑
i
πi =
∑
i;vi>pf
Bi + πk
Another way of bounding the revenue of the auction is to consider the ascending price procedure
and integrate the derivative over the supply over the price, i.e.:
W¯(x) ≥
∑
i
πi =
∫ pf
p0
p · [−∂pS(p)]dp +
∑
i;vi∈[p0,pf ]
vi · [S(vi−)− S(vi)]
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The first term represents the integral of the price over the derivative of the remnant supply. Since
the remnant supply is decreasing, we need to integrate minus the value of the derivative. The sum
in the second terms, takes care of the discontinuities in the supply function between vi− (just before
vi) and vi. Now, we know by the definition of δ
i
j that S(vi−)− S(vi) =
∑
j∈C(i) δ
i
j , which gives us:
W¯(x) ≥ p0
∫ pf
p0
[−∂pS(p)]dp +
∑
i;vi∈[p0,pf )
vi ·
Bi
vi
· |C(vi)|+ vk ·
Bk − πk
vk
· |C(vk)|
Now, we note that
∫ pf
p0
[−∂pS(p)]dp+
∑
i;vi∈[p0,pf )
Bi
vi
·|C(vi)|+
Bk−pik
vk
·|C(vk)| = 1 since it corresponds
to the total variation in the supply. So, we have a weighted sum of this total variation, where the
weights are all above p0. From this observation and the fact that |C(vi)| ≥ 1 for vi ≥ p0, we can
conclude that:
W¯(x) ≥
∑
i;vi∈[p0,pf )
Bi + (Bk − πk) + p0

1− ∑
i;vi∈[p0,pf )
Bi
vi
−
Bk − πk
vk


+
Combining this with the first bound we got on W¯(x), we get:
2W¯(x) ≥
∑
i;vi≥p0
Bi + p0

1− ∑
i;vi∈[p0,pf )
Bi
vi
−
Bk − πk
vk


+
≥ W¯∗
by the first bound obtained for W¯∗.
A direct consequence from the proof is:
Corollary 3.5 (revenue) If the clinching auction allocates items to more then one player, then
its revenue is at least 12 · W¯
∗.
The following example shows that our analysis is tight:
Example. Consider two agents with v1 = 1, B1 = ∞ and v2 = α ≫ 1, B2 = 1 and one unit of
a divisible good. For such parameters the allocation x¯∗ =
(
1− 1α ,
1
α
)
provides the optimal liquid
welfare W¯∗ = 2− 1α . The clinching auction generates allocation x = (0, 1) for which W¯(x) = 1. As
α→∞, the ratio W¯
∗
W¯(x)
→ 2.
4 A 2-Approximation via Market Equilibrium
We defined a quantifiable measure of efficiency (Section 2) and showed it can be approximated by
an incentive-compatible mechanism (Section 3). The remaining item in the list of desiderata was to
show that our efficiency measure allows for different designs. Here we show that we have “an extra
bunny in the hat”, an auction that also achieves a 2-approximation to the liquid welfare objective
and is not based on Ausubel’s clinching technique. Instead, it is based on the concept of Market
Equilibrium.
Borrowing inspiration from general equilibrium theory, consider a market with n buyers each
endowed with Bi dollars and willing to pay vi per unit for a certain divisible good. This is the
special case where there is only one product in the market. In this case, a price p is called a market
clearing price if each buyer can be assigned an optimal basket of goods (in the particular of a single
product, an optimal amount of the good) such that there is no surplus or deficiency of any good.
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Observe that there is one such price and that allocations can be computed once the price is found.
Our Uniform Price Auction simply computes the market clearing price and allocates according to
it. This defines the allocation. The payments are computed using the Myerson’s formula for this
allocation and happen to be different than the clearing price.
Definition 4.1 (Uniform Price Auction) Consider n agents with values v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn (i.e.,
ordered without loss of generality) and budgets Bi. Consider the auction that allocates one unit of
a divisible good in the following way: let k be the maximum integer such that
∑k
j=1Bj ≤ vk, then:
• Case I: if
∑k
j=1Bj > vk+1 allocate xi =
Bi∑k
j=1Bj
for i = 1, . . . , k and nothing for the remaining
players.
• Case II: if
∑k
j=1Bj ≤ vk+1 allocate xi =
Bi
vk+1
for i = 1, . . . , k, xk+1 = 1 −
∑k
j=1 xj and
nothing for the remaining players.
Payments are defined through Myerson’s integral (Lemma 2.1).
Case I corresponds to the case where the market clearing price of the Fisher Market instance is
p =
∑k
j=1Bj. Case II coresponds to the case where the Market clearing price is p = vk+1. First we
show that this auction induces an incentive-compatible auction that does not exceed the budgets
of the agents. (Proofs can be found in appendix A.) Then we show that it is a 2-approximation to
the liquid welfare benchmark.
Lemma 4.2 (Monotonicity) The allocation function of the Uniform Price Auction is monotone,
i.e., vi 7→ xi(vi, v−i) is non-decreasing.
Lemma 4.3 (Budget feasibility) The payments that make this auction incentive-compatible do
not exceed the budgets.
Theorem 4.4 The Uniform Price Auction is an incentive compatible 2-approximation to the liquid
welfare objective.
Proof : Let k be as in Definition 4.1. First we establish an upper bound on W¯∗. If x¯∗ is the
allocation achieving W¯∗, then: W¯∗ =
∑
imin(vix¯
∗
i , Bi) ≤
∑k
i=1Bi+
∑n
i=k+1 vix¯
∗
i ≤
∑k
i=1Bi+vk+1.
Let p be the market clearing price and x the allocation of the Uniform Price Auction. By
the definition of k, p ≤ vi for all i ≥ k, so for those players, vixi = vi
Bi
p ≥ Bi. Therefore
W¯(x) ≥
∑k
i=1Bi. Now, we also show that W¯(x) ≥ vk+1. In Case I, this is trivial since: W¯(x) ≥∑k
i=1Bi > vk+1. In Case II, vk+1 · xk+1 = vk+1 ·
(
1−
∑k
j=1
Bj
vk+1
)
= vk+1 −
∑k
j=1Bj < Bk+1, so:
W¯(x) =
∑k
j=1Bk + vk+1 · xk+1 = vk+1.
Summing up two inequalities, we have: W¯(x) ≥ 12
[∑k
j=1Bj + vk+1
]
≥ 12 · W¯
∗.
The same example used for showing that the analysis for the Clinching Auction was tight can
be used for showing that the analysis for the Uniform Price Auction is tight.
Example. Consider two agents with v1 = 1, B1 =∞ and v2 = α≫ 1, B2 = 1 and one unit of a
divisible good. We know that W¯∗ = 2 − 1α . The market clearing price for this instance is p = 1,
which produces an allocation x = (0, 1) with W¯(x) = 1.
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4.1 Better than the Clinching Auction: An Instance by Instance Comparison
One of the advantages in having a quantifiable measure of efficiency is that we can compare two
different outcomes and decide which one is “better”. In this section we show that although the worst-
case guarantees of the clinching auction and of the uniform-price auction are identical, the liquid
welfare of the uniform-price auction is always (weakly) dominates that of the clinching auction.
Theorem 4.5 Consider n players with valuations v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn and budgets B1, . . . , Bn. Let x
c
and xu be the outcomes of the Clinching and Uniform Price Auctions respectively. Then: W¯(xu) ≥
W¯(xc).
Proof : Let ku be the value of k as in Definition 4.1. We can write the liquid welfare as W¯(xu) =∑ku
j=1Bj+vku+1x
u
ku+1, where vku+1x
u
ku+1 ≤ Bku+1. Also, for i ≤ k
u, Bi = x
u
i max{vku+1,
∑ku
j=1Bj} ≥
xui vku+1, therefore:
1 =
∑
i x
u
i ≤
∑ku
i=1
Bi
vku+1
+ xuku+1 (∗)
Let πc be the payments of the clinching auction for v,B. By Lemma 3.3, there exists kc such
that for every i ≤ kc, πci = Bi and for i > k
c + 1, xci = 0. We can write the liquid welfare as:
W¯(xc) =
∑kc
j=1Bj +min{Bkc+1, vkc+1 · x
c
kc+1}. Also, the final price (as in Definition 3.2) is vkc+1,
and therefore Bi = π
c
i ≤ vkc+1x
c
i . Therefore:
1 =
∑
i x
c
i ≥
∑kc
i=1
Bi
vkc+1
+ xckc+1 (∗∗)
First we argue that kc ≤ ku. Assume for contradiction that kc > ku, then:
vku+1
∗
≤
∑ku
i=1Bi + vku+1x
u
ku+1 ≤
∑ku+1
i=1 Bi ≤
∑kc
i=1Bi
∗∗
≤ vkc+1(1− x
c
kc+1) ≤ vkc+1 ≤ vku+1
where the last inequality comes from kc > ku. This would imply that all inequalities above hold
with equalities, in particular: Bku+1 = vku+1x
u
ku+1, and therefore x
u
ku+1 =
Bku+1
vku+1
. Recall that we
also have that xuku+1 = 1−
∑ku
i=1
Bi
vku+1
, and therefore vku+1 =
∑ku+1
j=1 Bj , contradicting the definition
of ku.
So, we proved in the previous paragraph that kc ≤ ku. If kc < ku, then W¯(xc) ≤
∑kc+1
i=1 Bi ≤∑ku
i=1Bi ≤ W¯(x
u). Now, if kc = ku, then (∗) and (∗∗) together imply that xckc+1 ≤ x
u
ku+1, hence
W¯(xc) =
∑kc
i=1Bi +min{Bkc+1, vkc+1 · x
c
kc+1} ≤
∑ku
i=1Bi +min{Bku+1, vku+1 · x
u
ku+1} = W¯(x
u).
5 A Lower Bound and Some Matching Upper Bounds
In the previous sections, we showed two different auctions that are incentive compatible 2-approximations
to the optimal liquid welfare for the setting of multi-unit auctions with additive valuations. In this
section we investigate the limits of the approximability of the liquid welfare. By the observation
depicted in Figure 1, it is clear that an exact incentive compatible mechanism is not possible for
this setting. First, we present a 43 lower bound and show matching upper bounds for some special
cases.
Theorem 5.1 For the multi-unit setting with additive values and public budgets, there is no incentive-
compatible mechanism that approximates the liquid welfare objective by a factor better then 43 .
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Proof : Consider the problem of selling one divisible item to two agents that have equal budgets
B1 = B2 = 1. Let x(v1, v2) be the allocation rule for an auction that is a γ-approximation to W¯
∗.
Also, let x¯∗(v1, v2) be solution maximizing the W¯.
Fix some number α > 1 and consider the allocations of the auction for valuations (1, α), (α, 1),
(α,α). Since the mechanism is truthful, the allocation should be monotone (Lemma 2.1) so:
x1(1, α) ≤ x1(α,α) and x2(α, 1) ≤ x2(α,α). Since x1(α,α) + x2(α,α) ≤ 1 we get that one of
the summands is at most 12 . Let us assume that x1(α,α) ≤
1
2 and thus x1(1, α) ≤
1
2 (the other case
is similar). Since W¯(x¯∗(1, α)) = W¯(x¯∗(α, 1)) = 2− 1α , the γ approximation implies that:
γ−1(2− 1α ) ≤ min(1, x1(1, α)) + min(1, α · x2(1, α)) ≤ x1(1, α) + 1 ≤ 1.5
As α approaches ∞ we get that γ approaches 43 .
5.1 A Matching Upper Bound for 2 Bidders with Equal Budgets
For the special case of 2 players and equal budgets, we give a matching upper bound. Up to re-
scaling values and budgets, we can assume that the players have all budgets equal to 1. For this
special case, consider the following auction.
Definition 5.2 (43-approx for W¯
∗) Consider the following auction for 1 divisible good and two
bidders with (known) budgets B1 = B2 = 1. It maps values (v1, v2) to an allocation x = (x1, x2) and
is symmetric (i.e., for all v we have that x1(v, v) = x2(v, v)). So, we only need to specify x(v1, v2)
for v1 ≥ v2:
• if v1 = v2, x(v1, v2) = (
1
2 ,
1
2 )
• if v2 ≤
1
3 , x(v1, v2) = (1, 0)
• if 13 ≤ v2 ≤ 1, x(v1, v2) = (
1
4 +
1
4v2
, 34 −
1
4v2
).
• if 1 ≤ v2, x(v1, v2) = (
1
2 ,
1
2 )
Payments are calculated using Myerson’s Lemma 2.1.
One can verify that the allocation rule is monotone. Moreover, the payments that make this
auction truthful do not exceed the budget, since for any vi > 1, xi(vi, v−i) = xi(1, v−i). It remains
to prove the approximation guarantee, i.e., that W¯(x) ≥ 34W¯
∗.
Lemma 5.3 The approximation ratio of the auction in Definition 5.2 is 4/3, i.e., W¯(x) ≥ 34W¯
∗.
The proof is by case analysis and can be found in appendix A.
6 An O(log2 n)-approximation for Subadditive Players with Private
Budgets
In this section we consider the setting where players have subadditive valuations and private budgets.
This is a notoriously hard setting for Pareto-optimality. In fact, considering either subadditive
valuations or privated budgets alone already produces an impossibility result for achieving Pareto-
efficient outcomes.
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We will have one divisible good and each player has a subadditive valuation vi : [0, 1] → R+
and a budget Bi. This setting differs from the previously considered in the sense that budgets Bi
are private information of the players.
The auction we propose is inspired in a technique by Bartal, Gonen and Nisan [3]. To describe
it, we use the following notation: v¯(xi) = min{vi(xi), Bi}. Now, consider the following selling
procedure:
Definition 6.1 (Sell-Without-r) Let r be a player. Consider the following mechanism to sell
half the good, to players i 6= r using the information about v¯r(
1
2 ).
Divide the segment [0, 12 ] into k = 8 log(n) parts, each of size
1
2k . Associate part i = 1, . . . , k
with price per unit pi =
2i
8 v¯r(
1
2 ). Order arbitrarily all players but player r. Each player different
than r, in his turn, takes his most profitable (unallocated) subset of [0, 12 ] under the specified prices.
Players are not allowed to pay more than their budget.
More precisely, let p : [0, 12 ] → R+ be such that for x ∈ [
1
2k (i − 1),
1
2k i], p(x) = pi =
2i
8 v¯r(
1
2 ).
Now, for i = 1, . . . , r − 1, r + 1, . . . , n, let xi maximize vi(xi) −
∫ zi+xi
zi
p(t)dt where zi =
∑
j<i xj,
conditioned on the payment being below the budget, i.e.,
∫ zi+xi
zi
p(t)dt ≤ Bi. Set the payment as:
πi =
∫ zi+xi
zi
p(t)dt.
The subroutine Sell-Without-r is used in our main construction for this section:
Definition 6.2 (Estimate-and-Price) Given one divisible good and n players with valuations
vi(·) and budgets Bi, consider the following auction: let r1 = argmaxi v¯i(
1
2 ) and r2 = argmaxi 6=r1 v¯i(
1
2).
We say that r1 is the pivot player. Let (x, π) be the outcome of Sell-Without-r1 for players [n] \ r1
and let (x′, π′) be the outcome of Sell-Without-r2 for players [n] \ r2.
For players i 6= r1, allocate xi and charge πi. For r1 if vr1(x
′
r1)−π
′
r1 ≥ vr1(
1
2 )−2 · v¯r2(
1
2 ) allocate
him x′r1 and charge π
′
r1 and if not, allocate
1
2 and charge 2 · v¯r2(
1
2).
First, notice that the auction defined above is feasible, since r1 is allocated at most half of the
good and the players in [n] \ r1 get allocated at most half of the good. Now we show that this
auction is incentive compatible:
Lemma 6.3 The Estimate-and-Price auction is incentive compatible for players with private bud-
gets.
Proof : We argue that no deviation in which a player changes his value and his budget can be
profitable. For a player i 6= r1, if i deviates and does not become the pivot player, his allocation and
prices remain the same. Now, this player could try to deviate to become the pivot player. However,
in this case he either gets allocated as before, or he is allocated 12 and pays 2v¯r1(
1
2) > v¯i(
1
2), either
exceeding his budget or getting negative utility.
As for the pivot player r1, he cannot benefit from decreasing v¯r1(
1
2 ) so that he will no longer be
the pivot player (all other changes do not change his allocation and payment), since r2 will become
the pivot player in this case and r1 will be allocated as in the Sell-Without-r2. This is uselss for r1:
if r1 was allocated half of the good when playing truthfully, this means that the profit of r1 could
only decrease. If r1 was allocated as in Sell-Without-r2 when playing truthfully, then misreporting
did not change his allocation and payment.
Notice that the price offered to the pivot player is 2 · v¯r2(
1
2 ) and not v¯r2(
1
2 ) as the reader who
is familiar with [3] would expect. The change is because an auction on one item where every
player bids the minimum of his budget and value and the winner pays the second highest bid is
13
not truthful. To see that, consider two players with identical budgets that their value for the item
exceed their budgets. Each of the players has an incentive to report a slight increase in the budget
to win the item.
An O(logn)-Approximation for Submodular Bidders
We now show that the Estimate-and-Price auction is a poly-log approximation for subadditive
bidders. For clarity of exposition, we first show that for the special case of submodular bidders, the
Estimate-and-Price auction is a O(log n) approximation. Then we show how to modify the proof
to handle the wider class of subadditive valuations losing only an O(log n) factor.
Recall that a valuation function vi is subadditive if vi : [0, 1] → R+ such that vi(xi + yi) ≤
vi(xi) + vi(yi). The special case of submodular bidders is characterized by concave vi functions.
Now, we prove two lemmas towards the proof that the Estimate-and-Price auction is a O(log n)-
approximation. First, we claim that not all items are sold in the Sell-Without-r1 procedure:
Lemma 6.4 Let x be the outcome of the Sell-Without-r1 subroutine of the Estimate-and-Price
Auction, then
∑
i 6=r1
xi <
1
2 .
Proof : We note that
∑
i 6=r1
πi ≤
∑
i 6=r1
v¯i(xi) ≤
∑
i 6=r1
v¯i(
1
2) ≤ n · v¯r1(
1
2) by the definition of
r1. Now, if we were to sell
1
2 to [n] \ r1, we would have
∑
i 6=r1
πi =
∫ 1/2
0 p(t)dt ≥
∫ 1/2
k−1/2k p(t)dt =
1
2k ·
2k
8 v¯r1(
1
2 ) =
n8
16·8·log(n) · v¯r1(
1
2) > n · v¯r1(
1
2) since for n ≥ 1.8, n
7 > 16 · 8 · log(n).
Lemma 6.5 Let x† be the solution of maxW¯(x†) s.t. x†r1 = 0 and
∑
i 6=r1
x†i =
1
2 , then v¯r1(
1
2) +
W¯(x†) ≥ 12W¯
∗.
Proof : Let x∗ be the outcome s.t. W¯∗ = W¯(x∗), then v¯r1(
1
2) + W¯(x
†) ≥ W¯(12x
∗) ≥ 12W¯(x
∗),
where the first inequality comes from the fact 12 ≥
1
2x
∗
r1 and that
1
2x
∗
−r1 satisfies the requirements
of the program defining x†. The second inequality comes from the concavity of W¯.
Lemma 6.6 For submodular bidders, let x be the outcome of the Estimate-and-Price auction and
p¯ be the price of the cheapest unsold item, i.e., p¯ = limt↓(
∑
i6=r1
xi) p(t). Let also x
′ be any allocation.
Then for each i 6= r1, v¯(xi) ≥ v¯(x
′
i)− p¯ · x
′
i.
Proof : If xi ≥ x
′
i, this is true by monotonicity of v¯i. Now, if not, then player i did not acquire
more goods, then it must have been for one of two reasons: either he exhausted his budget or the
price exceeds his marginal value. Notice Lemma 6.4 shows that there are items that are available.
In the first case: πi = Bi, so v¯i(xi) = Bi ≥ v¯i(x
′
i). In the second case, vi(xi) ≥ vi(xi + ǫ)− p
′ · ǫ
for all ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ0] for some small ǫ0. By concavity of vi(·), vi(x
′
i)− vi(xi) ≤ p
′ · (x′i − xi) ≤ p¯ · x
′
i. So,
v¯i(xi) = vi(xi) ≥ vi(x
′
i)− p¯ · x
′
i ≥ v¯i(x
′
i)− p¯ · x
′
i.
Now we are ready to prove our main result:
Theorem 6.7 For submodular bidders, the Estimate-and-Price auction is an O(log n)-approximation
to the liquid welfare objective.
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Proof : We analyze two different cases, depending on which fraction of the optimal liquid welfare
is produced by player r1. Let x
† be as in the statement of Lemma 6.5. Then we consider:
Case I : v¯r1(
1
2) ≥ 4W¯(x
†).
We note that the utility of r1 is at least vr1(
1
2 )− 2 · v¯r2(
1
2 ) and that v¯r2(
1
2 ) ≤ W¯(x
†). Therefore:
ur1 ≥ vr1(
1
2 )− 2 · W¯(x
†) ≥ 12 v¯r1(
1
2 ) ≥ 2W¯(x
†) which implies that v¯r1(
1
2 ) + W¯(x
†) ≤ 2ur1 +
1
2ur1 =
5
2ur1 . Using Lemma 6.5, we get that: W¯(x) ≥ min{Br1,ur1} ≥
2
5 [v¯r1(
1
2) + W¯(x
†)] ≥ 25W¯
∗.
Case II : v¯r1(
1
2) < 4W¯(x
†).
Consider the price p¯ as defined in Lemma 6.6. If p¯ = p1 =
1
4 v¯r1(
1
2 ), then W¯(x) ≥ W¯(x
†) −
p1
∑
i x
†
i = W¯(x
†) − 18 v¯r1(
1
2) >
1
2W¯(x
†). Therefore: W¯∗ ≤ 2 · [v¯r1(
1
2 ) + W¯(x
†)] < 10 · W¯(x†) <
20 · W¯(x). If on the other hand p¯ = pk > p1, then:
W¯(x) ≥
∑
i 6=r1
πi ≥
k−1∑
i=1
pi ·
1
2k
≥ (p¯− p1) ·
1
2k
≥
1
2
· p¯ ·
1
2k
≥
p¯
32 · log(n)
where the two last inequalities come from the fact that the price doubles every interval. Now,
we know that: 16 log(n) · W¯(x) ≥ 12 p¯. Using that together with Lemma 6.6 for x
′
i = x
†
i , we
get: (16 log(n) + 1)W¯(x) ≥ W¯(x†). Since in this case: W¯(x†) ≥ 110W¯
∗ we have that W¯∗ ≤
O(log n) · W¯(x).
An O(log2 n)-Approximation for Subadditive Bidders
The only point we used in the previous proof that vi is concave is in Lemma 6.6. For proving every
other argument the subadditivity of vi suffices. To prove the result for subadditive valuations, we
re-define x† as the argmax of W¯(x†) conditioned on x†i = 0,
∑
i x
†
i =
1
2 and x
†
i ≤
1
2k . The extra
condition x†i ≤
1
2k implies that in the proof of Lemma 6.6 no player ever would need to pay more
the 2p¯ per unit. So, we can show that v¯i(xi) ≥ v¯i(x
†
i )− 2p¯ · x
†
i .
The only difference is that under this new definition that gap between W¯∗ and v¯r1(
1
2) + W¯
∗ is
not constant anymore, but O(k) = O(log n). This difference makes us lose another O(log n) factor
in the approximation ratio:
Theorem 6.8 For subadditive bidders, the Estimate-and-Price auction is an O(log2 n)-approximation
to the liquid welfare objective.
Extension to Indivible Goods
We note that all techniques in this section generalize to indivisible goods. For m identical indivisible
goods, one can get the an O(logm) approximation by dividing the items in O(logm) groups and
setting prices pi = 2
i · O(v¯r1(
1
2)), where vr1(
1
2 ) now stands for the value of player r1 for half the
good.
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A Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.2 : Fix a valuation profile v with v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn and let k be as in Definition
4.1. The agents i = 1, . . . , k do not change their allocation if they increase their value. For a player
i > k+1, their allocation can go from zero to non-zero once their value is so high that they become
the k+1 player. It remains to consider the k+1 player: as he increases his allocation and continues
to have the k + 1 highest value, his allocation increases, since it is xk+1 = 1−
∑k
j=1
Bj
vk+1
.
Now, two things can happen while vk+1 increases:
• the value of vk+1 reaches
∑k+1
j=1 Bj and the allocation gets updated to
Bk+1∑k+1
j=1 Bj
. At this point,
the allocation of xk+1 continues the same as vk+1 increases.
• the value of vk+1 reaches vk and displaces k and the k-th highest value. One of two things
happen: (i) if
∑k−1
j=1 Bj + Bk+1 > vk, then the market clearing price becomes vk = vk+1
and therefore the allocation xk+1 gets updated to 1 −
∑k−1
j=1
Bj
vk
≥ 1 −
∑k
j=1
Bj
vk
; or (ii) if∑k−1
j=1 Bj + Bk+1 ≤ vk, now the market clearing price becomes vk and k + 1 is now allocated
as
Bk+1
vk
≥ 1−
∑k
j=1
Bj
vk
.
Proof of Lemma 4.3 : For players i > k+1, this is trivial, since they do not get goods and pay
zero. For the rest of the players we look at the two cases:
• Case I : player k + 1 also does not get goods and pays zero. For the rest of the player,
their allocation is constant for any value v′i ≥
∑k
j=1Bj , so, their payment is bounded by
(
∑k
j=1Bj) · xi = Bi.
• Case II: player k + 1 pays at most vk+1xk+1 = vk+1 ·
(
1−
∑k
j=1
Bj
vk+1
)
< Bk+1, since vk+1 <∑k+1
j=1 Bj by the definition of k. For the rest of the players i ≤ k, their allocation is constant
for all v′i ≥ vk+1, so their payment is bounded by vk+1 · xi = Bi.
Proof of Lemma 5.3 : The proof is by case analysis. We assume v1 ≥ v2, since v2 ≥ v1 is
analogous.
• Case I : v1 ≥ v2 and v2 ≤
1
3
∗ I.1 : if v1 ≤ 1, then W¯(x) = v1 = W¯
∗.
∗ I.2 : if v1 > 1, then: W¯
∗ = 1 +min(1, v2(1−
1
v1
)) ≤ 1 + v2 ≤
4
3 and W¯(x) = 1.
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• Case II: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ 1
∗ II.1: if v1 + v2 ≥ 3, then: W¯
∗ ≤ 2 and W¯(x) = min(1, 12v1) + min(1,
1
2v2) ≥
3
2 .
∗ II.2: if v1+v2 ≤ 3 then W¯
∗ = 1+min(1, v2(1−
1
v1
)) = 1+v2(1−
1
v1
) since for 1 ≤ v1, v2 ≤ 2,
it is easy to see that v2(1−
1
v1
) ≤ 1. Also: W¯(x) = 12 (v1 + v2).
We want to show that 12 (v1 + v2) ≥
3
4 ·
[
1 + v2(1−
1
v1
)
]
. Re-writting that, we have that
this is equivalent to: v2 ≥
2v1−3
1−3/v1
. Taking derivatives, we see that 2v1−31−3/v1 is monotone
decreasing in the interval [1, 2], so for this interval: 2v1−31−3/v1 ≤
1
2 ≤ 1 ≤ v2.
• Case III: v1 ≥ v2,
1
3 ≤ v2 ≤ 1
∗ III.1: v1 ≤ 1, then W¯
∗ = v1 and W¯(x) = v1 · (
1
4 +
1
4v2
) + v2 · (
3
4 −
1
4v2
). Therefore,
what we want to show is that: v1 · (
1
4 +
1
4v2
) + v2 · (
3
4 −
1
4v2
) ≥ 34v1. We can re-write
this as 3v2 − 1 ≥ (2 −
1
v2
)v1. For
1
3 ≤ v2 ≤
1
2 , this is trivially true by sign analysis,
since the left hand side is non-positive and the right hand side is non-negative. For,
for 12 ≤ v2 ≤ 1, this is equivalent to v1 ≤
3v2−1
2−1/v2
, we note that the function 3v2−12−1/v2 is
monotone non-increasing in the interval [12 , 1] so:
3v2−1
2−1/v2
≥ 32 ≥ v1.
∗ III.2: v1 ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ v1 · (
1
4 +
1
4v2
), then: W¯∗ = 1 +min(1, v2(1−
1
v1
)) = 1 + v2(1−
1
v1
)
and W¯(x) = min(1, v1 · (
1
4 +
1
4v2
)) + v2 · (
3
4 −
1
4v2
) = 1 + v2 · (
3
4 −
1
4v2
). Therefore:
W¯(x) = 34(1 + v2) ≥
3
4W¯
∗.
∗ III.3: v1 ≥ 1 and 1 > v1 · (
1
4 +
1
4v2
), then: W¯∗ == 1 + v2(1 −
1
v1
) and W¯(x) =
min(1, v1 · (
1
4 +
1
4v2
))+ v2 · (
3
4 −
1
4v2
) = v1 · (
1
4 +
1
4v2
)+ v2 · (
3
4 −
1
4v2
). We want to show that
v1 · (
1
4 +
1
4v2
)+ v2 · (
3
4 −
1
4v2
) ≥ 34 (1+ v2(1−
1
v1
)), which can be re-written as v14 +
v1
v2
≥ 1,
which follows from v1 ≥ v2.
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